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How Can Trade Unions Act Strategically? 
Richard Hyman 
 
Summary 
It is generally agreed that trade unions require new strategies in response to external 
and internal challenges. Economic internationalisation makes it easier for employers to 
escape national structures of employment regulation, and appears to weaken the ability 
of governments to defend nationally-based social models; sectoral and occupational 
shifts in employment erode traditional union strongholds, while social and ideological 
changes undermine workers’ traditional orientation to collectivism. Yet what do we mean 
by trade union strategy, and how can it be modernised? This article addresses in 
particular the literatures on organisational learning, social capital and vocabularies of 
motive to explore how the twin principles of leadership and democracy can be 
harnessed to meet the challenges of the ‘new’ capitalism. 
 
 
Trade unions have often been described as ‘secondary’ or ‘intermediary’ organisations 
(Müller-Jentsch 1985). In the industrial arena, they provide a formal mechanism of 
collective representation, partially (though not totally) independent, to workers who are 
already organised collectively by the employer. Their organisational structures are thus 
indirectly shaped by the capitalist division of labour and by the practices and preferences 
of their members’ employers. In the socio-political arena, unions’ goals and methods are 
likewise shaped, even if in some cases conflictually, in reaction to the dominant 
institutional arrangements. In both respects, despite (usually sincere) professions of 
internationalism, their terrain of action is largely bounded by the contours of the nation-
state. 
 Capitalism is constantly restructuring and transforming: as Marx put it, capitalist 
survival requires ‘constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all 
social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation.... All that is solid melts into air.’ 
Yet historically we can speak of periods of relative stability and others of radical 
restructuring. The present moment is clearly one of systemic transformation; and at such 
times, trade unions are typically fire-fighters, reacting desperately to challenges to the 
established ‘industrial legality’. Typically also, they do so in a strategic vacuum.  
 What does it mean to describe trade unions as strategic actors, and how can 
they enhance their strategic capacity? These are the central issues for my discussion 
below. My original intention in approaching this paper was to survey concrete trade 
union experience in different countries, and no doubt many of my readers (and indeed 
the editors) would have preferred this. But I have come to the conclusion that much 
more work is needed to clarify our understanding of the meaning of strategy in the trade 
union context, and that there are many concepts and arguments in the broader literature 
of organisational-political processes which, interpreted critically, can be of key 
importance for trade union policy. So these are the focus of what follows. 
 
Challenges and Changes 
Almost universally, trade unions in Europe (and globally) are on the defensive, having 
suffered a decline in membership, in public status and in effectiveness in achieving their 
core objectives. There has been widespread discussion of the need for modernisation, 
revitalisation and renewal (Hälker and Vellay 2006). With their involvements in both 
formal organisational links and informal networking at European level, union policy-
makers have paid increasing attention to experience in other countries. 
 Does this entail that there has been a process of mutual learning, leading in turn 
to convergence towards ‘best practice’ in the selection of trade union goals and 
methods? There are reasons for scepticism. In short, there are clear cross-national 
differences in the character and severity of the challenges – from above and from below 
– confronting trade unions, in their organisational capacity to respond effectively, and in 
the traditions and identities which shape their directions of change. 
 Trade unions developed in the twentieth century as national actors. As collective 
bargainers, in most countries their primary role was at national (sectoral or cross-
sectoral) level. As ‘social partners’, their key concern was to influence the 
macroeconomic and social policies of national governments. The precondition of 
effectiveness in both cases was that their counterparts – employers collectively, and the 
state – enjoyed relative autonomy in shaping the wage relation. The increasing 
integration of the global economy, and more specifically the European economy, puts 
this autonomy in question. Many analysts have seen ‘globalisation’ (or, more narrowly, 
‘Europeanisation’) as a challenge from above which narrowly constrains the scope for 
employment regulation at national level, and hence undermines the regulatory capacity 
of trade unions themselves. Inability to achieve the improvements in real wages and 
social benefits which had become part of workers’ normal expectation is in turn seen as 
a reason for loss of membership and status. 
 Others have contested this analysis. Globalisation is a notion which is typically 
‘left vague and undefined, better to conjure up the large panoply of forces that have 
seemingly imposed similar imperatives across advanced industrialized countries’ 
(Schmidt 2002: 13). Yet some of the most successful (by conventional criteria) trade 
union movements have been located in relatively small, open economies. There is a 
substantial literature which insists that ‘globalisation’ is as much a political as an 
economic phenomenon and that the notion of the eclipse of the nation-state is a myth 
(Weiss 1998). From this perspective, a reversal of the gains achieved by trade unions in 
previous decades is not inevitable. This is certainly part of the thesis developed in 
Western’s important study (1998): unions thrive where they are ‘institutionally isolated’ 
from market forces (by government policies of demand management, institutional 
supports for collective bargaining coverage, and/or a formal role in welfare 
administration). Where unions are already relatively strong, they are best able to 
maintain an influence on public policies in order to limit the damaging effects of 
‘globalisation’. The logic of this interpretation is that the gap between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
union movements is likely to widen, spelling growing diversity rather than convergence. 
As a corollary, the severity of external challenges to trade unions, precisely because 
these are mediated by political decisions, will be cross-nationally variable. 
 Trade unions in most countries achieved their peak of membership and hence 
representativeness with the expansion of large ‘Fordist’ manufacturing firms and of 
centralised public services. In the former case, sectoral collective agreements took 
wages out of competition and provided employers with (at least partial) guarantees of 
labour peace; in the latter, public authorities often had a political rationale for 
encouraging collective representation. Typically also, union strength was based among 
male manual workers in full-time employment and with more or less permanent 
contracts. Often, trade unions mirrored the centralised, bureaucratic character of their 
members’ employers; while the construction of solidarity among a workforce with limited 
opportunity for individual career advancement encouraged the pursuit of a standardised 
‘common rule’ in employment. 
 Changes in the demography of both employers and employees have challenged 
established regulatory processes from below. Curbs on public expenditure, and in some 
countries an extensive process of privatisation, have diminished the size of former public 
sector strongholds. The average size of private firms has shrunk (in part because of the 
fashion for contracting out activities which were formerly undertaken in-house), and 
small firms tend to be less unionised and less willing to affiliate to employers’ 
associations or observe collectively agreed conditions; while increasingly, even large 
private employers seek to develop company-specific regimes of production organisation 
and conditions of employment, either abandoning their associations or insisting on a shift 
to a two-tier bargaining system in which decentralised negotiations assume 
predominance. In some respects linked to these trends, there has been everywhere a 
relative decline in the manufacturing sector and a growth in private services, which in 
most countries have in the past been weakly unionised. In all these respects, the 
structure of employers which supported a nationally standardised system of industrial 
relations has given place to a ‘post-Fordist’ pattern which, it is often argued, 
presupposes a more diversified and fragmented system, often without any form of 
collective bargaining. 
 The parallel changes in the labour force are in part a consequence, in part a 
reflection of separate dynamics. Universally, white-collar employees today outnumber 
manual workers. In almost all countries, the former were traditionally far less well 
unionised than the latter, to some extent because the scope for individual career 
progression inhibited collective consciousness but also because many trade unions had 
reservations about recruiting occupational groups which were seen as close to the 
employer. Among manual workers, occupational differentiation has increased, and 
indeed the boundary between manual and white-collar (always conventional as much as 
real) has become blurred. The growth in non-manual occupations is linked to a 
feminisation of the workforce; and many union movements in the past failed, or often 
made no serious effort, to recruit and represent women. To some extent a connected 
process, there has been a growth in part-time employment. Other increasingly prevalent 
forms of ‘atypical’ work include fixed-term contacts, agency work and dependent self-
employment: again, categories not traditionally unionised in most countries. In many 
cases the labour force has also become far more ethnically diverse, and minority groups 
have often been neglected by trade unions. 
 To some extent related to these workforce trends, it is often argued that 
employees have become more individualist in orientation; or, put rather differently, that 
work itself has a diminishing importance in defining personal identity. To the extent that 
disparate personal life-worlds shape employees’ expectations and aspirations from work, 
the possibility that a standardised common rule can satisfy is diminished. As Björkman 
puts it (2006: 330), ‘there are no average members’ any longer. For many analysts, the 
consequence is that solidarity is no longer possible, or at least cannot be sustained as 
traditionally defined by most trade unions. 
 Though the above trends are common across countries, the extent to which 
economic and occupational structure has been transformed varies cross-nationally. But 
in addition, how trade unions experience and evaluate such trends varies substantially. 
Locke and Thelen (1995) have suggested that ostensibly similar issues vary markedly in 
significance according to national circumstances and traditions; while apparently 
dissimilar issues may have the same implications. More specifically, the historical 
formation of distinctive national union identities shapes those issues which are likely to 
provoke major conflict and those which are not. Hence in the USA, the struggles of the 
1930s and 1940s established a system involving rigid job definitions and a prescribed 
seniority-based hierarchy of promotion opportunities and job security; in consequence, 
employer demands for more flexible forms of work organisation challenge principles of 
union action in ways which do not arise in most European countries. By contrast, in 
Germany the pressures for more flexible organisation of working time and for greater 
company-level discretion in wage determination clash with the institutional/ideational 
significance of the Flächentarifvertrag. Conversely, in both Sweden and Italy (though in 
very different ways) egalitarianism has been a vital component of trade union identities, 
and pressures for increased pay differentials between and within sectors in the one 
case, the abolition of the scala mobile in the other, had disruptive effects which would 
not have occurred in different national contexts.  
 This argument has parallels with my own discussion (Hyman 2001) of trade 
union identities and ideologies as involving a triangulation between market, class and 
society. Unions whose raison d’être rests primarily on control of the labour market 
through pay bargaining with employers (as in the UK) will be more sensitive to an 
erosion of economic bargaining power than those (as in France) oriented more centrally 
to mobilising workers, whether or not union members, to press government for 
improvements in minimum wages and social benefits. Inherited identities also shape the 
likely trajectory of union renewal: trade unions rarely overturn all their past definitions of 
character and purpose; rather, they adapt selectively, and seek to persuade members 
and activists that any changes remain consistent with the fundamental values and 
objectives of previous generations. For this reason, the course of ‘modernisation’ is likely 
to be path-dependent. 
 Whether, and how, unions respond to external and internal challenges is also 
conditioned by what may be termed organisational capacity. This can be understood as 
the ability to assess opportunities for intervention; to anticipate, rather than merely react 
to, changing circumstances; to frame coherent policies; and to implement these 
effectively. It is not easy to theorise or to specify concretely the components and causal 
dynamics of organisational capacity, but it is obvious to any informed observer that some 
European trade union movements possess this quality to a far greater degree than 
others. Perhaps we may define the key elements as structure, intelligence, strategy and 
efficacy (Hyman 1997). Structure indicates the degree to which national trade unionism 
is unified or fragmented between rival organisations, and hence possesses the 
competence to aggregate diverse perspectives into a common set of priorities. 
Intelligence is in part an organisational matter: the extent to which unions and 
confederations possess specialist expertise in research, education and information-
gathering, and the means to disseminate knowledge throughout the organisation (which 
is to some degree a question of resources); but it is also (and perhaps more importantly) 
a matter of the degree to which, at all levels within union movements, knowledge is seen 
as an essential component of union power. Strategy depends on organisational 
procedures and traditions which link knowledge to action through analysis of 
circumstances, evaluation of alternative options and planning of objectives and forms of 
intervention. Finally, efficacy is in part a question of the attainability of union policies 
within the objective context; in part, of the overall coherence (notably, between and 
within unions) of aims - which is more easily achieved where a reasonable degree of 
centralised authority exists; in part, of the degree to which union members (and non-
union workers) ‘own’ the strategic priorities and are willing to take action in their pursuit - 
which calls for scope for decentralised initiative. I explore some of these dimensions in 
more detail below. 
 
What Is Strategic Capacity? 
The notion of strategy is often used loosely. Etymologically it is a military metaphor, 
deriving from the Greek for a general: strategy denotes the planning of a whole 
campaign or war, in contrast to the tactics deployed in a single battle. This clearly 
requires a long-term perspective (though there will surely be disagreements on the 
nature and duration of the campaigns in which unions are engaged, and indeed whether 
they regard industrial relations as analogous to war), and also effective overall 
coordination. 
 The literal origins of the term also suggest that strategy is closely related to 
leadership. This is a concept which often causes unease to those committed to union 
democracy. ‘Who says organisation, says oligarchy,’ Michels famously concluded. Union 
democracy clearly requires adequate scope for all categories of members to shape the 
priorities and programmes of their organisations. It also requires appropriate structures 
for participation, involvement and self-activity at rank-and-file level. Yet grassroots self-
determination alone, as Streeck (1988: 312) has argued, seems a recipe for ‘a “pluralist” 
multitude of small, narrowly based collective action units competing with each other for 
organizational resources and political influence’ and lacking ‘a capacity to deliberate and 
control the macro-level outcomes of their actions’. 
 The self-negating consequences of purely decentralised democracy can be 
transcended only when articulated – a point developed further below – by coordination 
from above. Union effectiveness requires ‘the capacity to interpret, decipher, sustain, 
and redefine the demands of the represented, so as to evoke the broadest possible 
consensus and approval’ (Regalia 1988: 351). This is one of the functions of leadership, 
which is therefore a prerequisite for participative democracy to deliver beneficial results. 
As Barker et al. insist (2001: 15-17), it is crucial to differentiate between authoritarian 
and authoritative leadership, and between leadership as hierarchy and as process or 
function: ‘leadership is exercised at all manner of levels and locations… and not only by 
those obviously designated as “leaders”’. Gramsci’s notion of the ‘organic intellectual’ is 
relevant here: grassroots activists may develop a breadth of information and analytical 
capacity which distinguish without distancing them from their colleagues. Hence there 
can, and must, be a complex dialectic between leadership and democracy.  
 One of the most substantial attempts to explore trade union strategic capacity in 
terms of such a dialectic is the study by Ganz (2000) of the unionisation of California 
farm workers in the 1960s. The United Farm Workers (UFW) possessed only limited 
resources, but compensated for this through what Ganz terms ‘resourcefulness’. This 
derived from the interaction between the personal qualities of the UFW leadership team 
and the union’s internal organisational structures (factors which, one might add, are 
often causally interconnected). ‘Strategic thinking is reflexive and imaginative, based on 
how leaders have learned to reflect on the past, pay attention to the present, and 
anticipate the future’ (2000: 1009). Such creative thinking is essentially collective; it is 
most likely when there is a leadership team from diverse backgrounds and with a range 
of organisational experiences, and is least likely when there is a homogeneous 
leadership group deeply embedded in bureaucratic routines. The organisational 
characteristics which Ganz identifies are ‘deliberative arrangements, resource flows, and 
accountability structures’ (2000: 1007). Where there are effective channels of both 
horizontal and vertical dialogue over aims and methods, with democratic involvement of 
activists and the general membership, and a recognition that union effectiveness 
depends ultimately on the members’ willingness both to pay and to act (Offe and 
Wiesenthal 1985), the scope for successful strategic initiative is enhanced. This point 
has been reiterated by Heery (2005) in Britain and Milkman in the USA (2006: 152-3): 
successful organising requires an interconnection between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
approaches. 
 
Organisational Learning 
Trade unions are collective organisations, and insights from analysis of strategy within 
(typically capitalist) organisational settings are thus potentially at least of relevance to 
trade unions. The notion of organisational learning has received growing attention within 
the management literature over the past three decades. One may question some of the 
presuppositions underlying this concept: not only whether organisations are unitary 
actors (as discussed below), but also whether – or in what sense – organisations as 
such act at all. Action clearly occurs within organisations, and by individuals and groups 
in the name of organisations, typically deploying organisational resources; but these 
social and political processes are mystified by attributing the essentially human process 
of action (or, more specifically, of learning) to more abstract and impersonal entities. Be 
that as it may, organisations are clearly contexts within which learning can occur, and 
organisational effectiveness may well depend on the capacity of those within them 
collectively to learn appropriate responses to new challenges – and, in the process, as 
emphasised below, often to unlearn  responses which are no longer appropriate. 
 Huber (1991) provides a useful overview of recent managerial literature, 
identifying four dimensions of organisational learning. The first is the acquisition of new 
knowledge; the second, its dissemination and generalisation within an organisation (for 
‘organizations often do not know what they know’ (1991: 100); if information and 
experience are fragmented among a diversity of individuals and groups, without overall 
coordination, their potential is radically diminished. Third is the interpretation of 
knowledge: making sense, inevitably selectively, of what increasingly involves 
information overload. Finally, organisational memory is essential if useful learning is not 
to be lost. All four dimensions have obvious relevance in the trade union context. 
 Also relevant are distinctions between different types or levels of learning. 
Bateson (2000: 167-9, 274) distinguishes between first-order ‘proto-learning’ and 
second-order ‘deutero-learning’. In the first, an individual solves problems by trial and 
error; with experience, the correct solution is applied without the need to experiment. In 
the second, the individual learns how to learn, and is able to devise solutions more 
rapidly to new problems. While Bateson founded his analysis on animal (and individual 
human) behaviour, a similar distinction was soon proposed by Argyris and Schön (1974) 
in the context of business organisations: that between single- and double-loop learning. 
The former involves learning to apply established procedures; the second, critically 
scrutinising these procedures. Organisational politics normally make the latter difficult, 
since it requires those at the sharp end of organisational practices to challenge the 
policies and procedures defended by those in more powerful positions; the prudent 
course is to keep quiet. Hence normal organisational processes encourage subordinates 
to suppress doubts and conceal information, reinforcing single-loop learning; double-
loop learning tends to occur only in ‘extreme conditions’ of crisis (Argyris 1976: 373). 
 Much of the vast subsequent literature on organisational learning addresses how 
the obstacles to second-order learning may be overcome and positive incentives 
created. Nonaka (1994) points to two key questions: how the knowledge of individuals 
within an organisation can be generalised and socialised; second, an overlapping issue, 
how knowledge which is intuitive and not explicitly articulated can be made explicit. Part 
of his answer is that it is necessary to create ‘communities of interaction’ through which 
individuals share experience on a foundation of mutual trust, synthesising discrete 
understandings into a more coherent whole. How does this occur? One answer is that a 
crisis for the organisation can generate ‘creative chaos’ which in turn encourages social 
learning. Another is that individuals who possess surplus (‘redundant’) information may 
integrate this in innovative ways. A third is that those in intermediate positions in the 
organisation may facilitate both upwards and downwards communication. Finally he 
suggests, by analogy with computer software, that such processes are facilitated by the 
construction of a ‘hypertext’ structure which can ‘provide the organization with a strategic 
ability to acquire, create, exploit and accumulate new knowledge continuously and 
repeatedly’. This requires non-hierarchical institutions to complement the more 
hierarchical arrangements which govern routine activities. 
 Can such analyses be applied to trade unions, and if so, how? Zoll (2003) has 
extended Bateson’s core distinction to ‘trade unions as learning organisations’. In 
responding reactively to specific challenges, they exhibit first-order learning. To the 
extent that they recognise that new challenges are the order of the day, and are able to 
develop internal structures and processes to facilitate reflection over new problems and 
collective discussion of appropriate responses, they advance to second-order learning. 
But Zoll goes on to suggest the need for third-order learning, involving the critical 
scrutiny and redefinition of unions’ existing learning strategies and structures, and more 
fundamentally of their existing understanding of what it is to be a trade union. The 
challenge of attracting and representing a far more diversified employee constituency 
than existed even a few decades ago means that to survive and thrive, unions must 
reinvent themselves as organisations.  
 More recent literature on organisational learning has had little impact on trade 
union analysis, but its relevance is not hard to perceive. One of the few systematic 
applications of this literature in the trade union context is the study by Huzzard and 
Östergren (2002) of the Swedish private-sector white-collar union SIF. They point out 
that theories of organisational learning have been developed within a unitarist, 
managerialist framework, tending to neglect internal diversity and conflict over 
organisational identity and purpose (Huzzard 2001). This is even more a problem in the 
context of trade unions, which – unlike business organisations – have an explicit 
democratic rationale, and in which competing ideological tendencies possess at least a 
degree of legitimacy. Huzzard and Östergren found a major disjuncture between the 
‘modernising’ conceptions of the national SIF leadership – seeking to move towards a 
more individual-oriented service to workers and greater partnership with employers – 
and the continued commitment of most local leaders to the values of collectivism, 
solidarity and (if necessary) militancy. The authors interpret this ideological contrast as a 
‘barrier to organisational learning’. An alternative reading, however, is that local activists 
fully understood the problems which the national leaders identified and the alternative 
strategies they were proposing, but rejected the latter as deriving the wrong lessons 
from the former. This indeed is the message of their conclusion (2002: S58): trade 
unions ‘have difficulties in developing shared meanings, visions, ideologies and 
identities;’ but ‘if learning is a dialectical process, then ideological differences may even 
promote reflection and learning rather than hinder them’. 
 Two final considerations on organisational learning are important. The first 
follows from Huber’s argument that ‘organizations often do not know what they know’. In 
an important sense, of course, organisations as such do not ‘know’; knowledge is a 
human capacity, though the knowledge of many individuals is synthesised, disseminated 
and retained within organisations. However, experience acquired at specific levels or in 
particular locales within a union (or any other organisation) may not be generalised (and 
as Argyris and Schön suggest, there may even be structural disincentives to 
generalising valuable experience). To return to the analysis of Ganz, effective intra-union 
communication channels – what Culpepper (2002), in a different context, calls ‘dialogic 
capacity’ – are thus of key importance; and, one may add, to the extent that the most 
serious challenges today concern labour movements as a whole, effective inter-union 
(and indeed international) channels are essential.  
 The second point to emphasise is that before we can learn we may have to 
unlearn our established routines and conventional wisdom. Hall (1993: 279), in his 
analysis of ‘social learning’ at the level of the state, has argued that ‘policymakers 
customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the 
goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the 
very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing’. And it is certainly the case 
that trade union policy-makers ‘tend to rely on familiar repertoires or behavioural scripts 
when faced with new conditions’ for which old tactics may be inappropriate (Johnston 
1994: 37). Milkman (2006) has shown how the organisational approaches which served 
effectively a few decades ago for American industrial unions in large-scale 
manufacturing industries were totally unsuited to the growing numbers of low-paid, 
insecure service employees often working for small subcontracting employers; locals 
without an industrial union background have been the most successful in organising 
such groups. In the management literature, the notion of ‘competency traps’ (Levitt and 
March 1988) is widely used: skill in applying methods which worked well in the past is an 
obstacle to innovation in changed circumstances. Within trade unions, particularly those 
long established, the widespread respect for precedent and protocol means that the 
traditions of all the dead generations frequently inhibit learning; as Ross and Martin 
comment (1999: 4), unions 'are "path dependent", constrained organizationally by their 
pasts. They tend to move in directions which will not threaten shared ideas, values, and 
habits and their organizational learning will be skewed towards what is already known.' 
To overcome such conservative bias, strategic innovation often requires a process of 
creative destruction. 
 
Membership Activism, Union Democracy and Social Capital 
The logic of the previous discussion is that strategic capacity in trade unions is a product 
of both leadership and internal democracy. In his classic comparative study, Kjellberg 
(1983) argued that the most effective union movements combined, in an articulated 
manner, strong central organisation (coordinated leadership) with vibrant local activity 
(high membership participation). This combination was one of the explanations of the 
exceptional unionisation in Sweden. A similar thesis has been developed more recently 
by Lévesque and Murray (2003), who explore the means of refashioning trade union 
power in the face of economic internationalisation. They propose a triangulation between 
three elements: the strategic capacity of workplace union organisation (its ability to 
develop a proactive agenda rather than simply reacting to management’s initiatives); the 
internal democratic life of the union (‘internal solidarity’), which enables members to 
identify with – or in the current jargon, to ‘own’ – the policies pursued on their behalf; and 
‘external solidarity’, the degree to which broader national (and international) 
organisational resources and commonalities of interest shape local priorities and 
counteract the pressures towards competitive undercutting of standards. Their 
conclusion is the need to build a virtuous circle of proactive capacity, active democracy 
and higher-level strategic support as the basis for an effective strategy for labour: ‘it 
seems more and more obvious that these three levers of power are mutually reinforcing’ 
(2003: 22). 
 In a subsequent study, Lévesque et al. (2005: 402) suggest that workers’ 
identification with trade unionism has been undermined by a ‘radicalization of difference. 
Divergent social identities challenge traditional notions of collectivity and lead to an 
erosion of the relevance of traditional frames of reference.’ Their survey of union 
members in Québec found that those most likely to see trade unionism as relevant to 
their own circumstances felt that they were consulted over union policy and had an 
opportunity to shape its direction. ‘Democracy is a building block in the construction of 
union identity’ (2005: 409).  
 Richards argues (2001: 35-6) that ‘labour solidarity has always been a 
constructed and contingent phenomenon built on local foundations. It is now more so 
than ever in an era of generally decentralised industrial relations, increasingly localised 
threats, fragmented work forces and growing corporate power.’ Yet a fragmentation of 
solidarity, in a context where localised workers are increasingly compelled to compete 
with those in other localities, is no effective solidarity at all. This means, to return to the 
starting point of this section, that local activism is necessary but not sufficient for 
effective union strategy. But how can fragmentation be overcome?  
 In the past, unions have often striven to overcome differentiation by imposing 
what the Webbs (1897) termed a ‘common rule’, or what I have described as 
‘mechanical solidarity’, imposed from above (Hyman 2004). But the ‘radicalisation of 
difference’ means that diversity cannot be suppressed; it must be accepted, even 
welcomed. The issue is how actual and potential trade union members can be 
encouraged to perceive common interests despite difference, and to negotiate the 
tensions which often exist between their own multiple social identities in a way which is 
compatible with collectivism. This is to raise difficult questions of human subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity. As Zoll has insisted (1991), increased differentiation of circumstances 
and interests, and the growing uncertainty of social norms and values, make effective 
unity of action possible only if trade unions become ‘discourse organisations’. And here, 
I believe the notion of social capital may be relevant. 
 Social capital is a notoriously problematic concept, popularised by Putnam (1993, 
1995) in a manner which is ‘troubling and potentially politically reactionary’ (DeFilippis 
2002: 791). Putnam’s central argument is that individuals benefit from social capital 
when they participate in a variety of social networks and voluntary organisations, and 
that a dense associational life contributes to the strength of the broader community and 
polity. In some respects this overlaps with much recent usage of the equally ambiguous 
notion of civil society. Critics (for example DeFilippis 2002; Fine 2002; Law and Mooney 
2006; Levi 1996; Portes 1998) have shown that Putnam’s treatment neglects the role of 
power, inequality and class in shaping individuals’ social and economic opportunities; 
encourages a ‘blame-the-victim’ approach to disadvantage and social exclusion; and 
fails to recognise that dense social networks can often serve to exclude, oppress and 
victimise ‘outsiders’. 
 Nevertheless, the concept has a longer lineage, as Field (2003) and Portes 
(1998) have shown, and in the case of writers like Bourdieu has a very different meaning 
from Putnam’s. The same is true of the cognate idea of civil society, which historically 
has had a variety of conflicting interpretations. What is the relevance to trade unions? 
Crucially, it seems to me, the idea of social capital can indicate that union organisation 
derives its vitality from the networks of social relationships among the individuals who 
constitute the (actual or potential) membership, and that the quality of their interpersonal 
or ‘sociable’ relationships gives the union its human face and ultimately its capacity to 
act. Understood primarily in collective rather than individual terms, social capital can 
define a potential resource for the relatively powerless and disadvantaged to challenge 
those who are economically and politically dominant, a basis for resistance. This is 
certainly not what Putnam and his followers envisage (Law and Mooney 2006: 20). 
However it has some affinities with the classic analysis of the Webbs, who saw the 
internal democracy of trade unions as a force for broader societal democratisation, 
allowing workers ‘to regain collectively what has become individually impossible’ (1897: 
850). 
 This collective dimension of social capital emerges clearly, for example, from the 
four-country research by Dufour and Hege (2002): ‘representative capacity’ derives in 
part from formal institutional provisions but depends no less on the quality of the 
interrelationships between representatives and their constituents, on the responsiveness 
of representatives to the often individualised everyday concerns of workers, indeed their 
readiness to act as a kind of social worker in dealing with issues arising outside of work 
itself. Since networks of sociability pre-exist formal collective organisation, they can 
provide the springboard for unionisation (or conversely, for unwillingness to unionise) 
and the resource for effective dialogue. The latter was demonstrated in the study by 
Batstone et al. (1978) of a British engineering factory: the workplace union leadership 
was able to shape their constituents’ ‘willingness to act’ by orchestrating debate and 
discussion through the network of first-line shop stewards down to informal groups of 
workers who ate lunch together, played cards during rest breaks or debated the previous 
Saturday’s football match. In the USA, Fantasia (1988) described a similar articulation 
between informal social groupings and union solidarity. 
 In an analysis based on US experience, Jarley (2005) has argued for the 
development of what he calls ‘social-capital unionism’: trade unions should adopt the 
role of a facilitator of mutuality among workers, as a basis for recovering their 
membership and influence. He suggests that the ‘servicing model’ of unionism, by 
making members dependent on the full-time officials, actually weakens networks of 
collective mutual support among workers and thus reduces their social capital. The 
‘organising model’ in some respects devolves collectivism back to the workplace, but 
tends to replace dependence on officials with dependence on a core of committed 
activists who are themselves liable to victimisation or ‘burn-out’. His alternative model 
creates a more diversified social network, with no clear demarcation between mutual 
support on issues which are ‘union-relevant’ and those which are less obviously so; 
linkages built up over one type of issue can subsequently facilitate collective action over 
others. A study of two local branches of the United Food and Commercial Workers’ 
Union (Johnson and Jarley 2005) suggests that such a model proved effective in 
recruiting and involving young workers in the union, as well as in broader political 
activism. 
 Two particular advantages of ‘social-capital unionism’, Jarley suggests, are 
building union capacity to ‘borrow and extend the social capital of its most well-
connected members’ (2005: 12); and the fact that social networks, because not confined 
to purely workplace issues, can be sustained among workers who are mobile across 
employers, making union membership more readily ‘portable across firms’ (2005: 19). 
Interestingly, though Jarley does not develop this point, there are analogies both with the 
principle of ‘mutual insurance’ which the Webbs saw as the core of solidarity within early 
craft unions, and the efforts of early socialist trade unions to organise a wide array of 
social activities to increase the cohesion and loyalty of their members. Whether or not 
Jarley’s model is considered practical, the idea of re-inventing broad networks of 
mutuality, potentially as a basis for ‘insurgent social capital’ (Law and Mooney 2006) to 
resist the relentless drive of neo-liberalism, certainly deserves serious consideration. 
 
Vocabularies of Motive, Ideologies and Utopias 
A theme of much of the preceding analysis has been that trade union strategic capacity 
can be, and needs to be, enhanced through internal dialogue, discussion and debate. 
Uniform policy cannot be mechanically imposed when the ‘average’ member no longer 
exists (if s/he ever did); increasingly, unions need to be ‘discursive’ or ‘dialogical’ 
organisations, allowing the explicit negotiation of increasingly overt internal differences. 
This prescription is not of course unproblematic: within any union, some individuals and 
groups are more motivated and/or able to voice their opinions and interests than others. 
Traditionally, the formal democracy of many unions has been a framework within which 
certain sections (male, full-time, native-born, relatively skilled) have dominated policy-
making. Today, electronic communications permit a far broader participation in strategic 
dialogue, but as anyone involved in union message boards appreciates, the most active 
participants tend to be self-selected advocates of a distinctive agenda. How to achieve 
‘bottom-up’ dialogue which is truly representative of the diversity of rank-and-file opinion 
is a major challenge.  
 One answer is that ‘social-capital unionism’ would necessarily enhance the vocal 
capacity of the less articulate members and constituents. Another, which links back to 
Offe and Wiesenthal (1985), is that one of the leadership tasks in agenda-setting is to 
transform particularistic and competitive demands and aspirations into more 
encompassing policy goals by redefining the ‘spontaneous’ self-definitions of interest. 
And here, it is necessary to move beyond the process of discourse and dialogue to the 
content. Fragmentation of employee identities and self-definitions of interest is not a 
natural development, but rather the outcome of politically-driven efforts to erode national 
post-war industrial relations settlements and hence to weaken or remove workers’ social 
protections and set them in competition and conflict one with another. What is at issue is 
a radical shift in the balance of forces between labour and capital. Dore (2003: 32), a 
writer not given to over-dramatisation or leftist rhetoric, has described the attack at 
national level on established employment protections as the outcome of ‘not only 
flexibility/efficiency objectives but also the political objective of breaking the power of the 
trade unions and their ability to influence the electorate’. In his assessment, ‘politicians 
who responded with the legislation demanded by the powerful managerial class, were 
not just concerned with creating the conditions for national competitiveness. They were 
also engaged in class struggle.’ Class struggle is a good description for the Washington 
consensus, and it is equally fitting as a characterisation of its current enthusiasts in 
Brussels. 
 To defend employees at workplace level and no less within the national (and 
international) political economy requires a confrontation with the dominant policy logic of 
our age. This implies that unions must turn (or return) to a self-conception as 
organisations campaigning for rights and engaging in 'contentious politics' (Tarrow, 
1998). This involves an assertion of unions' identity as 'sword of justice' (Flanders 1970): 
contesting oppression, inequality and discrimination. It can also imply cooperation, often 
uneasy, with other social movements which have never acquired the respectability 
gained by trade unions in most countries. Potentially it redefines unions as outsiders in a 
terrain where until recently the role of insiders was comforting and rewarding. 
 The key issues here involve ideas, language and mobilisation. The decline of 
union organisation is in part ideological in causation: European unions were able to 
thrive when the prevailing policy discourse made collective regulation, employment 
protection and state welfare provision the commonsense of the times. The ideological 
counter-revolution of the past three decades – which has indeed proceeded further and 
faster in some countries than in others – has placed trade unions very much on the 
defensive. They are often seen as representing a vested interest: those who are already 
relatively secure in the labour market, and have relatively good wages and working 
conditions; those who are in most cases winners or at least not major losers in the 
process of economic restructuring. But unions have to convince themselves and others 
that they are the voice of the majority, that they represent the losers as well as the 
winners and that they want to try to convert the losers into winners.  
 The battle of ideas is also a battle of words. Human actors ‘discern situations 
with particular vocabularies, and it is in terms of the same delimited vocabulary that they 
anticipate consequences of conduct. Stable vocabularies of motive link anticipated 
consequences and specific actions’ (Mills 1940: 906). Yet the vocabularies of motive 
which legitimated traditional trade union action have an archaic ring today. As Kelly has 
insisted, trade unions require effective linguistic means of ‘framing’ workers’ perceptions 
of the circumstances that afflict them, of attributing blame for their problems, and of 
proposing credible remedies. If for example workers accept that deteriorating conditions 
of work, or threats of workplace closure, are the inevitable outcome of uncontrollable 
economic forces, collective resistance is futile. If they blame employers or governments 
for their predicament but have no conception of alternative policies, they may protest but 
are unlikely to prevail. Touraine (1966) argued along very similar lines many years ago. 
 Tilly (2006) has made the analogous point that socio-political movements draw 
on ‘repertoires of contention’: forms of action which have been developed in the past and 
provide ‘scripts’ for the future, but which nevertheless are subject to constant innovation. 
Such repertoires, he suggests (2006: 184-5), contain three key elements: ‘identity’, the 
assertion that those involved are a group with distinctive interests and the capacity to 
pursue these vigorously; ‘standing’, the insistence that these deserve to be taken as 
seriously as the claims and interests of other more powerful socio-economic groups; and 
‘programme’, an integrated set of demands. All three in his view are mutually supporting. 
Indeed this is a useful prism through which to regard European trade unions: in their 
period of greatest strength they could credibly claim to represent a constituency with a 
strong collective identity, to possess the standing of a valued actor in societal policy-
making, and to articulate a programme which reflected the general interest. In more 
recent times, in most countries, all three claims have been weakened, and this 
weakening has been mutually reinforcing. New vocabularies which give meaning to the 
identity, standing and programme of trade unionism are part of the key to union survival 
and renewal. 
 Much more broadly, unions have to win back their legitimacy. There is a battle of 
ideas taking place, a battle which is often one-sided. There is a widespread consensus, 
not only in Washington but also in Brussels, which accepts the virtues of neo-liberal 
globalisation, treats ‘competitiveness’ as an ungovernable force, and assumes that work 
and workers must be adapted to the new economic realities. ‘There is no alternative,’ 
prime minister Thatcher used to say. But there have to be alternative ways of connecting 
economy and society, work and life, and trade unions should be in the forefront of 
defining these alternatives. Trade unions need a new vision, even a new utopia if they 
are to become subjects rather than objects of history.  
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